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ABSTRACT 
 
The increasing development of computer based technologies open new horizons in task automation, 
helping pilots and air traffic controllers to carry out the analysis and resolution of an increasing number of 
cognitive tasks, in complex working environments. However, there is a general agreement that cognitive 
automation may lead to overtrust, complacency and loss of the necessary operational situation feed back, 
as the basis of the mental model refreshment which, in turn, allows for the maintenance of coherent 
situation awareness of all the operational processes. 
The case study reported suggests there is a dimension to be followed in human machine integration, 
which is beyond the technological deterministic approach of human machine interface design, and calls 
for a better human comprehension of system nature. The human comprehension of this dimension, which 
we introduce as the technological factor, represents the basis of systemic self-constructed situation 
awareness, in a real human centered development. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Situation Awareness is one of the most referred concepts, ever since the study of Operational 
Decision Making Processes, in complex working environments, comes to discussion.  
From the individual perspective to the team dimension, Situation Awareness evolved throughout 
many definitions and theories (Dominguez et al., 1994) either supporting the development of 
sophisticated measurement methods - Query Techniques, Rating Techniques, Performance Based 
Techniques - or showing the most effective design techniques and rules to integrate Human Factors in 
System Development.  
But, being a complex cognitive process, situation awareness can hardly be disaggregated in a set of 
simple definitions, as those required to support automation algorithms. On the other hand, there is general 
agreement that cognitive automation may lead to overtrust, complacency and loss of the necessary 
operational situation feed back, as the basis of the mental model refreshment which, in turn, allows for the 
maintenance of a coherent situation awareness of all the operational processes.  
Based on a reported incident at Lisbon ACC, this paper intends to discuss the limits of situation 
awareness in the context of human centred operational decision. Considering the hypothesis that cognitive 
automation, as an extension of human cognitive capabilities, will lead to the construction of virtual 
extensions (replacing comprehension by information) of human mental models, we introduce the concept 
of technological factor to be balanced against human nature development, as well as human factors are 
against technological development. 
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Situation Awareness and trust in Automation  
Late 80's and 90's witnessed an enormous development of information technologies, which have 
been, in the aviation field, the basis for the implementation of new ground and airborne facilities and 
techniques towards an always greater rational use of the airspace, in response to a continued growing 
airline industry demand for more processing capacity.   
This situation is the basis of a growing development of machine-automated tasks and information 
processing that has been under air traffic controller's responsibility. 
But, automation may lead to data overload (Endsley & Esin, 1995; Grau, Menu & Amalberti, 1995; 
Woods, Patterson & Roth, 1995), stressing the air traffic controllers to rely on the automated system, as a 
virtual extension of their own mental models. ATC operators may find themselves in an automation 
overtrust situation, replacing comprehension by information and loosing control of one of the most 
important phases of human cognition process: the construction of self mental model on the operational 
environment (Wickens, 2002; Bonini, Jackson & McDonald, 2001; Dzindolet et al., 2000; Hollnagel, 
Cacciabue & Bagnara, 2000; Parasuraman 1997; Muir, 1994; Bainbridge, 1982; Hopkin, 1975).  
Situation awareness will then tend to be system obtained – figure 1, and not operationally self-
constructed. The Human operator may tend to follow and trust unreliable automation, even when there is 
an evident discrepancy conflict between automation and operational reported or visible evidence 
(Wickens, 1998). 
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                    Figure 1– System based decision-making process 
  
This tendency to (over)trust in automation as been well reported by a number of automation research 
studies (Rahman & Hailes,1995; Bisantz et al., 2000; Dzindolet et al..,2000; Muir, 1987) and it was also 
the main concern of the US National Research Council Committee on Human Factors study on human 
factors issues of ATC systems and technology: efforts to modernize and further automate the air traffic 
control system should not compromise safety by marginalizing the human controller’s ability to 
effectively monitor the process, intervene as spot failures in the software or environmental disturbances 
require, or assume manual control if the automation becomes untrustworthy. (Wickens, Mavor & McGee, 
1997, p. ix). 
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But what if there is no evidence of a system malfunction, while it really exists? What if the system 
information is so clear and normal, that there is no reason to assume that something is going wrong? How 
can the air traffic controller spot such an inconsistency of the information presented to him?  
The answered is found in the concept of self-constructed situation awareness, as a dynamic/cybernetic 
cognitive process of checking and validating all the perceived information (mental picture) against 
cognitive mental model, allowing a coherent planning according to the foreseen future state of the 
operational environment. Only then, we can say that the air traffic controller may eventually, spot any 
“invisible” system inconsistencies, although this is virtually impossible in recent air traffic control 
automated systems, where, as we already said, comprehension is being replaced by more and more 
information, which has to be processed in real time and in a few seconds. For the air traffic controller, 
trustful information is fundamental for his job and that is the reason why it is out of the question to even 
presume that a normal shaped and well-presented automated information should be questioned. 
 Controllers are system believers. They just need to believe it exists and it’s trustful. Like God. 
 
The Day God Failed 
Lisbon ATC centre sector was very busy. For that reason, phone coordination between control sectors 
had been replaced by the “automatic” procedure of assuming the traffic, at the moment it was spotted, on 
radar display by the next air traffic controller, some five minutes before entering the respective 
jurisdiction area. While being normal at rush hours, this procedure (resulting from the great knowledge 
and trust of all air traffic controllers in each other’s work) implies that control is essentially radar 
supported, as no flight progress strips are manually pre-activated at the subsequent control sector. 
 
The facts  
 
At 1640 LMU134 calls for the first time Lisbon control (north sector) and, after squawking 3247, is 
radar identified.  
At 1650, the pilot is told to contact Lisbon centre sector, and the controller of the centre sector asks 
the pilot to confirm the flight level 370.  
At 1657 the air traffic controller had some doubts on the profile and correct position of LMU134, so 
he asked the pilot to squawk ident. After this new identification, and confirmation of the aircraft’s 
position, the pilot was instructed to turn left, direct to VFA.  
Still, three minutes later, the aircraft was showing a different heading that the one it should be flying, 
if routing direct to Faro. For that reason, the centre sector air traffic controller asked once more the pilot 
for confirmation, this time on the flying heading. The answered was that LMU134 was flying heading 
203. But the radar was showing LMU134, on heading 226… At this time, the controller realised that 
something was wrong with the radar representation of LMU134.  
Searching a reason for the discrepancy between the reported heading, and the one he was spotting in 
the radar display, the controller assumed the possibility of a mistake of his north sector collage, when 
assigning the SSR code to the aircraft, i.e., may be the track showing heading 226 would not be the one of 
LMU134. To verify this possibility, he searched for the LMU134 flight progress strips (remember they 
were not pre-activated, due to the automatic procedure, already mentioned) to confirm the SSR code 
mentioned there.  
Once more, the SSR code allocated to the flight was correct: the flight progress strips showed code 
3247, the same code north sector controller gave to the pilot and was displayed in the track’s radar label. 
After this, the controller thought there was still the possibility of an operator mistake at the flight data 
section, during the SSR code allocation procedure. So, he called the flight data section for confirmation of 
the correct SSR code of LMU134. And the answered was 3247… 
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From this moment on, the air traffic controller lost situation awareness towards LMU134, based on 
his own comprehension of the operational situation, and decided to adjust his mental picture to a 
refreshed mental model  (after all the radar image was quite clear and trustful, and he had already checked 
every possible human error - pilot, flight data section and himself) based now on a situation awareness 
built exclusively on radar processed information.  
At this time, DAL693 was also flying FL 370 and, according to the radar information on a parallel 
track to the LMU134, while XLB566 was flying north at FL 350. 
Based on the refreshed mental model, after the checking procedures already mentioned, the position 
of the three aircraft left no doubt about the good separation between them. That is why, the air traffic 
controller found no reason for the TCAS advisory reported by the pilot of the LMU134, who requested 
descent, to avoid a traffic conflict. Anyway, and for the pilot’s comfort, the controller decided to clear the 
descent of LMU134 to FL 350- fig.2 a). 
This decision, while absolutely correct in relation to the information showed by the radar, and 
coherent with the refreshed mental model of the air traffic controller, created an additional air miss 
conflict between LMU134 (descending to FL 350) and XLB566 (maintaining FL 350) – fig.2 b).  
 
 Figure 2.    a) – The Radar Image                                                b) – The Real Operational Situation 
 
 
The Investigation 
The investigation, which followed this events, showed that LMU134 has been in conflict with two 
other aircrafts, while the radar image shown no conflict at all. 
The investigation also concluded there has been a real, trustful, and almost impossible to detect 
discrepancy, between the real position of LMU134 and the position processed and displayed by the radar 
data processing system. This situation lasted for 21 minutes and the real (correct) position of the aircraft 
could only be spotted in the radar display, for as much as 2 (two) seconds.  
The main reason for this abnormal behaviour of the radar processing system, has been found in the 
incompatibility of the software developed for the recently installed monopulse radar antennas, and the 
software of the main system, installed in the mid eighties. Yet, there is still a question for which this 
explanation does not suit:  
 Why did it only happen with LMU134?  
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Discussion 
When analysing this incident, there is a question everybody asks: “How could such a situation last for 
21 minutes, without the air traffic controller realise it and find a correct solution?”  
In fact, although being aware of the all situation, it took an 18-minute discussion to a group of three 
incident experts, to find out which kind of action should have been taken by the executive controller, 
instead of replacing his own constructed and comprehensive situation awareness, by a system processed 
one. Realising that information is the base of the decision-making process, the group concluded that, for 
the necessary psychological balance needed for his job, an air traffic controller has to trust the automated 
system, for the day he doesn’t, safe and coherent decision will be replaced by uncertainty and ambiguity. 
This incident was only possible because the air traffic controller trusted unconditionally the radar 
automated processed information. In fact, should he have used a procedural method of identification, for 
example, VOR/DME readings, he could have realized the correct geographical position of the aircraft.  
But procedural control qualification doesn’t exist anymore… 
Another lesson learned is that in a situational awareness lost situation help is always needed, but no 
more than one person, preferably the operational supervisor, shall be involved. Otherwise, decisions 
become incoherent, as the air traffic controller will assume all kind of suggestions he will possible hear 
from the colleagues, trying to help. To avoid this situation, all air traffic controllers should be acquainted 
with TRM – Team Resource Management techniques.  
NAV has already implemented this training as a routine in normal radar courses, where specific 
exercises are executed, along with different routine training, according to the specificities of each control 
unit. 
 
Conclusion 
This incident shows that automation needs to be balanced against human nature, but not exclusively 
in the field of human factors or cognitive ergonomics. Trust and overtrust in automation is an important 
dimension to be taken into consideration in future human centred technological development (Eurocontrol 
2003). This means that, along with the development of error tolerant systems to cope with possible human 
errors, humans need to be trained in an automation error tolerant perspective, as well, i.e., operational 
training based on a system nature understanding in a comprehensive way, allowing humans to evolve 
from system operators to real in-loop system managers.  
This approach, including technological factors in human training goes beyond user adaptation to 
automation. It has to be understood in a systemic interaction perspective, where the real interface between 
humans and machines is each own nature. 
While this integrative dimension is not achieved, we will have human error tolerant systems 
development to be operated by unconditional system believers.  
As we said before, that is the case of air traffic controllers. So, what else could have been done, that 
the controller didn’t? One must remember there was no evidence of a system malfunction, whatsoever. 
“Only” the processed information and the expected one, for that particular flight, didn’t match…  
Everybody agreed it is not easy, when there is no evidence of a system error, to reject the system 
automated processed information and assume entire responsibility for that. In these circumstances it is 
more acceptable, for the air traffic controller, to doubt his own perception and comprehension of the 
operational situation, than to question the system. After all, “God” doesn’t fail!  
But, this time “He” did. 
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